Unpacking the African Peace and Security Agenda: Opportunities for Africa Turkish Relations?

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Introduction

My venture here is to debunk afro-pessimism that seems to have informed the literature on Africa conflicts and policy analysis in the western. It has become an almost truism that Africa is a dark continent riddled with poverty corruption and conflict, a metaphor for instability and economic deprivation. Reminiscent of Chinua Achebe's *things fall apart the center cannot hold;* albeit the fact that the end of Cold War was supposed to reduce tension, and pay out a "peace dividend" amidst the third wave of democratisation, hence insinuating Fukuyama's end of history. Consequently, Africa is perceived as a market for weapons, AIDS drugs, crazy youths, untamed social forces and kleptocrats.[1] As such, Africa is a place that the civilise world must shown except with regards to its natural resources and the war against terrorism.

Between 1960 and 1990, there was 80 violent change of government in the continent. By the end of 1998, only 39% of 48 SSA countries enjoyed stable political conditions and good governance, 23% faced political crisis and turbulence while 38% were engaged in armed conflict or civil strife.[2] Sudan, Somalia, Chad, Central African Republic and Cote d'Ivoire are still engulf are still steeped in bitter political struggles. however, there is no doubt Africa is gradually making success in arresting conflict and improving on good governance on the continent (For example, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda), to a large extent aided by its peace and security architecture and agenda.

In response to bourgeoning demands by the continent to address its own conflicts, within the context of globalisation, international indifference and disengagement from its problems, the African Union (AU) was founded in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, as the premier African institution to address questions of peace and security on the continent. It is within this context that the African peace and security agenda and architecture was conceptualized and designed. However, little is known about the

African Union and its work let alone its peace and security architecture especially the Peace and Security Council, which is the de facto executive decision-making body on security issues.

The result of this lack of knowledge has been that, the international community is in the dark of what opportunities and challenges exist for engagement with the continent. Even where engagement does exist, it is on an ad hoc and paternalistic basis devoid of any understanding and compassion for African realities. Turkey has demonstrated an interest in engaging with the AU and it is useful to explore possible areas of collaboration. This paper is a contribution in exploring possible areas of collaboration between Turkey and Africa by examining what constitute the African peace and security agenda and architecture. In doing so the paper will attempt at addressing the following questions: What are the causes of conflict in Africa? What are some of their characteristics? How have changes in the global political economy affected African conflicts? How has the AU responded to the challenges of conflicts on the continent? Why should Turkey be interested in African Peace and Security Agenda? How should Turkey engage Africa?

What Are the Causes of Conflict in Africa and What Are Some of Their Characteristics?

Many competing explanations have animated the discourse on the recurrence of conflict in Africa. For reason of brevity, only the two prominent reasons: greed and ethnicity will be discussed. However, I must confess that my emphasis on greed and grievance and ethnicity is not an innocent venture. There is no doubt Turkey's booming economy is in need of natural resources which Africa has in abundance. As such any one who does not agree that Turkey's engagement with the continent is grounded in realpolitik is surely leaving in his own world cut off from contemporary politics. Moreover, ethnicity might have informed some EU engagement with the continent especially in the realm of migration. Thus as Turkey prepares to accede to the EU, it is important that the country appreciate the fallacy of ethnicity in Africa.

Greed Versus Grievance:

Inspired by the crisis in Sierra Leone, DRC, Sudan and Angola, and in search for an explanation of conflict against the backdrop of the end of Cold War this theoretical analysis has increasingly been used to describe and analyse conflict on the continent. Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea (Conakry), Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, Sudan are countries endowed with abundant natural resources but with appalling human rights and development records. In a nutshell, it seems African countries rich in natural resources are economically stagnant, undemocratic, patrimonial, corrupt and vulnerable to conflict thus deserving the epithet of being good examples of *resource curse*[3] or *paradox of plenty.*[4] But what makes natural resource abundance a poisoned chalice?

Within the academic and policy circles it has become *received wisdom* that three channels of causation can be used to explain the resource curse in Africa.[5] From an econometric perspective, the resource curse is the result of exchange rate appreciation caused by a resource boom that makes other sectors of the economy un-tradable (Dutch Disease).

The second explanation, grounded in development economics and couched in the greed and grievance analysis, posits that conflicts in Africa are ignited and sustained by natural resource wealth, coveted for purposes of enrichment as well as for the weapons it can purchase (war economies).[6] The third explanation, through the prism of political science, argues that a resource boom causes institutional decay, corruption and political instability as leaders use natural resource wealth without accountability to their people (Political Dutch Disease).[7]

The theoretical and analytical focus of the literature (specifically quantitative) is couched in public choice, and rational approach of politics steeped in economic analysis. For example, anchored on utilitarian framework drawn from Grossman[8] and Azam[9], Collier et al argue that, war occurs if the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to cost. They distinguish between two possible motives behind civil wars; "justice-seeking" (grievance) and "loot-seeking" (greed). Greed is the desire by parties of a conflict to loot for their private gains. Rebels have an incentive to

challenge government because the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict is seen as offering opportunity for extortion which finances and sustain a war.[10] Incentive for rebels was related to the probability of victory and its consequences, and also the capacity of the future government to reward its supporters, and the population desire for secession. Capacity to reward supporters depended on the government military expenditure; capacity to reward the desire of secession on the population. Cost were opportunity cost which increase with the per capita cost (a high income population has more to lose than a low income population during rebellion

David Keen argues that to understand conflicts thus negotiating a successful peace accord, one has to understand the economic dimensions of the conflicts. He points out that, "War has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means. War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection. Keen argues that in the context of civil wars, members of armed groups can benefit from looting and governments can use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters or maintain their access to resources. Under these circumstances ending civil wars becomes difficult, and defeating the enemy may not be desirable.

Keen distinguishes between two forms of economic violence, namely "top-down" and "bottom-up". Top-down violence is mobilised by political leaders and entrepreneurs, and can be influenced by factors such as a weak state, an economic crisis, a strong threat to a regime and competition for valuable resources. Bottom-up violence is violence employed by citizens and/or low-ranking soldiers. It is fuelled by social and economic exclusion, the absence of a strong revolutionary organisation or ideology, and the belief that violence will go unpunished. Natural resource dependence leads to conflict because; natural resources are a 'honey pot' thus Politics becomes the contest for control of these revenues. This produces a spoil politics and politics of corruption – aided and abetted by foreign corporate behaviour – and sometimes directly a politics of violence. The stakes are highest in low-income countries because control of the state implies massive revenues relative to other income-earning opportunities grounded in the absence of a viable private sector.

Le Billion (access to natural resources) gives this argument further nuance, by arguing that political violence is connected to access to natural resources, thus their location and spatial distribution, extractive and productive activities and the extent to which they can be easily exploited by rebels. Access to resources is not only determined by the location of the resource, but also its type and pattern of exploitation which are determined by lootability, obstructability and legality. Lootability is the ease with which resources can be extracted and transported by individuals and small teams of unskilled workers. It is obstructable if transportation can be easily blocked by a small number of individuals with few weapons and they are unobstructable if can only be blocked with a massive army. Legally of if it can be easily traded in the market. He finds that extractive commodities are connected to hard form of violence, while commodities whose production implies chain (agric) associated to organized crimes, illegal trade. Resources can be proximate of distant from the capital or center of control. The higher the distance of control the higher is the control cost of the state and the opportunities of the rebels to obtain financing. Auty differentiate between point and diffuse resources. The latter is concern with productive activities while the former is concern with extractive activities.

He suggests that secessionist movements are more likely when a resource is physically concentrated, appropriated by locals and requires foreign investment-since locals can only attract this investment if their territory achieves recognition as a sovereign state. If the resource is not geographically concentrated, and requires little or no foreign investment- such as alluvial diamond-locals may have an incentive to back local warlord instead of fighting for outright independence.[11] In pursuit of this line of thinking Englebert argues that the conflict in Congo did not disintegrate into a secession battle most likely because the oil resources are situated offshore thus difficult to control.[12] Rather the battle was about the control of the administration of the oil rents thus making the political capital the most important battle ground.

Does this theoretical analysis correctly capture the realities of African conflict? However, despite the positive correlation observed, why do other natural resource rich African countries experiencing appalling human security and bad governance have not collapsed into conflict? As Ross points out, for every rich resource country that has suffered from violent conflict, two or three avoid it.[13] As such, should one

conclude that resource abundant countries in Africa that have evaded conflict are merely lucky? From a methodological and policy perspective, this analysis is inherently flawed. While natural resource abundance might be a necessary factor in informing the preference and objectives of political actors, institutional configuration is the sufficient factor in explaining the different levels of conflict in natural resource rich countries. As a consequence, no matter how tempting natural resource abundance might be and how they may exacerbate political stability and conflict, they are unlikely to stimulate civil war on their own without regards to the political and social context.

The issue of timing seems not to have been raised in the debate so far. If oil does have an influence on the onset of civil war how did it influence the onset of conflict in RoC in 1993 and not before? The silence of timing can again be explained on the reliance of rationalist approach which assumes that individuals rational beings/homo economicus with an ultimate goal of maximizing benefits faced with a scale of preference. Political actors are involved in a zero sum game whereby the relative gain of one belligerent translates to losses by the other (Prisoner's Dilemma). Rationalists do not necessarily believe that all actions are motivated by shorter economic benefits. Using the rational approach, the literature thus fails to appreciate the important of political institutions in shaping and structuring the political process consequently the political outcome. The point of departure of rationalist institutionalist is not their emphasis on the role of institutions, but rather, their treatment of institutions as exogenous rather, that endogenous variables in shaping politicians preference and strategy. Even Politicians do not operate in a vacuum; they are embedded within a political context which provides constraints and opportunities. For example, in an attempt to explain political transition in Africa, van de Valle concluded that the differences in sub-Saharan Africa's incumbent neo-patrimonial regimes shaped contingent factors such as political protests and military interventions that were important to transition outcomes, but did not themselves directly influence the success of transitions.[14] Institutions do more than merely shape contingent events; they have powerful and independent direct effects on the outcomes of political transitions in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

Ethnicity and African Conflicts

The conflict in Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire and Rwanda like many other conflicts in Africa has been described as ethnic conflicts. African conflicts are essentially a result of a hobbesian state of nature-nasty, brutish and short. Hence, Conflicts in Africa are short of any moral underpinnings, but can be understood in terms of untamed natural forces. Thus "physical aggression is part of being human, only when people attain a certain economic, educational and cultural standard is this trait tranquillised." Kaplan further points out that, the lack of education and land hunger among the youth who have become "loose molecules in an unstable social fluid"[15] It is against this backdrop, Kaplan suggest that the only way the west can help Africa is to stay clear of its business and close it borders. It thus seems the recent restrictions on migration in Europe and the racial violence against Africans specifically in France might have been informed by this pessimist view of Africa.

Civil wars may be fought on ethnic lines but ethnicity is not a cause of civil war. Hizkias Assefa aptly concludes that a conflict stated by elites ends up being a self-fulfilling prophecy engulfing the entire ethnic group. He further argues that

> there is growing evidence to posit the view that elites in
> African societies particularly those of the political class, have
> shown no restrain in manipulating the people through feeding
> them with ethic prejudice. Personal interests of such leaders
> are framed in ethnic terms and the bells of ethnic solidarity
> are rung to rally support even if at the risk of developing
> animosity against another group considered to be the
> enemy.[16]

This view sits well with Amilcar Cabral's dictum that "there are no real conflicts between the people of Africa; there are only conflicts between their elites.[17] I thus concur with the Carnegie Commission on preventing deadly conflict that:

> The words ethnic, religious, tribal or factional-important they
> may be in intergroup conflict-do not, in most cases,
> adequately explain why people use massive violence to

achieve their goals. These descriptions do not, in themselves, reveal why people would kill each other over differences. To label a conflict simply as an ethnic can lead to misguided choices by fostering a wrong impression that ethnic, cultural and religious differences inevitably result to violent conflict and that differences therefore must be suppressed. Time and again in this century, attempts at suppression have too often led to bloodshed and in case after case, the accommodation of diversity within appropriate constitutional forms has helped to prevent bloodshed.[18]

To conclude, conflicts in Africa stems from scarcity and contestation over resources. Thus, the manner in which resources are distributed and managed fuels and sustains conflicts. Lefwich argues that politics is principally the activities of conflict, cooperation; and negotiation involving the use, production and distribution of resources, whether materials or ideal, whether at local, national, or international level.[19] Consequently, politics of resources distribution is at the heart of contemporary conflicts in Africa taking cognisance of Laswell's definition of politics as a question of who gets what, how and when.[20]

Characteristics of African Conflict

Regional in character: most African conflicts are regional in character; they begin in one country and eventual spread to neighbouring countries. For example the crisis in Liberia was started from Cote d'Ivoire, it then spread to Sierra Leone and then Cote d'Ivoire with devastating consequence on Guinea Conakry. Also the crisis in Chad, Central African Republic and Darfur are interlinked. Same applies to the crisis in Burundi, DRC and Rwanda

Almost invariably, African conflicts are fought line ethnic lines but this does not in any way make them ethnic conflict. Ethnicity is barely a instrument of mobilisation. For example the conflict in Burundi was fought along the Tutsi Hutu cleavage, same applies to Rwanda. In Cote d'Ivoire the conflict is fought along the Christian south Muslim north divide, same as in Darfur.

Foreign intervention: foreign players have been ever present in African conflicts either for bonafide or malicious purposes. Foreign players are sometimes western countries and until recently china. The rationale for foreign intervention has changed from ideology (Cold War) to pure economic reasons. However, the dawn of globalisation has increased the number of foreign players as evidenced by the emergence of big multilateral companies especially in the domain of natural resources.

Another recurrent characteristic of African conflict is war economies and the abuse of humanitarian aid. The abuse of humanitarian aid and the exploitation of natural resources such as diamond, oil, and cocoa have played a prominent role in sustaining both government and rebel war effort in Africa. For example, the diamonds played a critical role in supporting the war effort of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola.

Non implementation of negotiated cease fire has become a prominent feature of African conflicts. For example thirteen peace accords were signed by belligerents during the Liberian civil war, but failed to be implemented during a six years period. Four peace accords where signed in Angola, eleven in Somalia and five in Sudan. These initiatives where dead letters once parties left the negotiating table. It seems then that once a conflict starts in Africa, it becomes a long drawn battle with incidental cessation of hostilities, negotiated ceasefire, peace agreement and national elections, which are in reality an adjournment of the conflict. In essence, while these accords have become canons for national reconciliation and government of national unity, they carried within them germs of conflict.[21]

3) How Has the AU Responded to the Challenges of Conflict on the Continent?
The creation of the AU was necessitated by the need to meet the challenges of preventing, managing and resolving conflict on the continent within the context of good governance. It is important to appreciate that the creation of the AU was within the context of the triumph of neoliberalism, indifference to African conflict, competing political interest amongst some African leaders specifically Mbeki, Obasanjo and Khadafi.[22] The creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002 must be

seen as a step of crucial importance in the development of a new peace and security architecture to replace the Organisation of African Unity. In structural terms, the AU offers a set of entirely new proactive conditions, whereas the OAU, its predecessor, was marked by a largely unsatisfactory record in the field of peace and security, owing to the inhibiting principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the affairs of member states. In connection with some positive developments at regional level and with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) initiative, the AU is now seen as constituting a realistic 'African reform programme' designed to set new African political accents, and at the same time to consciously seek support from abroad.

The big difference between AU and OAU does not only lie in the paradigmatic shift from conflict management to conflict prevention and the redefinition of security as human security. But most importantly the concept of sovereignty and non intervention can no longer be used as a shield to perpetrate human rights abuse (article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union). The AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact define Human Security" means the security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also includes the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her full development;

What is the African Peace and Security Architecture and Agenda?[23]
The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) refers to a well ordered blueprint and neatly assembled structures, norms, capacities, and procedures relating to averting conflict and war, mediating for peace, and maintaining security on the Continent. The following represents what constitute the APSA

AU PSC: Reading between the lines with regards to the objectives (Article 3 of the AU Protocol Establishing the PSC) principles (Article 4) and function of the PSC (Article 6), one is quick to realise that the PSC is at the epicenter of the APSA. The PSC is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council is a collective security and

early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The Peace and Security Council shall be supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund." (Art 5(2) of the Constitutive Act). The PSC may establish such subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions, the Peace and Security Council has concluded that, at the initial stage, the following committees may be established as needed and on a case-by-case basis in future: a Resource Mobilisation Committee with each region being represented; a Committee on Procedures and Mechanisms for Peace Support Operations with each region being represented, and Preparation of the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa.

According to Article 5 of the Protocol the Peace and Security Council is composed of 15 Members elected on the basis of equal rights, of which 10 serve for two years and 5 for three years. The Council meets at least twice a month at the level of Permanent Representatives, and annually at the level of Ministers and Heads of State and Government. The Protocol on the Peace and Security Council provides that meetings of the Council are to be closed, but that the Council may decide to hold open meetings during which "… civil society organization involved and/or interested in a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council may be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion relating to that conflict or situation." Perhaps more important than participation in open meetings of the Peace and Security Council, the Council may also hold informal 'consultation' with civil society organizations "…as may be needed for the discharge of its responsibilities." Consequently, in conformity with the provisions of the Protocol, the Peace and Security Council shall hold the following types of meetings: consultations; closed sessions during which decisions are taken; and open sessions to receive briefings and at the end of which no decisions are taken. Members of the Peace Security Council shall refrain from making substantive comments or raising questions requiring substantive discussion during public meetings. Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure of the PSC states that, at the end of each meeting, the Peace and Security Council may issue a Communiqué relating to its deliberations. In practice, the PSC has formatted the outcomes of its deliberations in two forms: decisions communicated through the issuance of a communiqué or press statement. The Dakar Declaration recommended

that the PSC decision should be communicated as follows: Communiqué on a decision of a closed PSC meeting on a given issue; Press Statements on the outcome of a PSC meeting, at which no decision was taken

Panel of the Wise: Article 11 of the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the PSC provides for the establishment of a Panel of the Wise in order to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention. Basically the Panel is an early warning mechanism aimed at stemming conflict before it breaks out. The Panel is composed of five highly respected African personalities selected by the Chairperson of the Commission after consultation with the Member States concerned, on the basis of regional representation and appointed by the Assembly to serve for a period of three years. Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (East Africa), b. Brigalia Bam, Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (Southern Africa), c. Ahmed Ben Bella, former President of Algeria (North Africa), d. Elisabeth K. Pognon, President of the Constitutional Court of Benin (West Africa), and e. Miguel Trovoada, former President of Sao Tomé and Principé (Central Africa);

Continental Early Warning System: Article 12 of the PSC Protocol now provides for the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The CEWS consist of a Situation Room that will be part of the Peace and Security Department. The Situation Room is linked to the observation and monitoring units of regional organizations such as those being established within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These are to collect and process data at their respective levels and transmit the same to the continental Situation Room.

The CEWS is specifically mandated to collaborate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centres, academic institutions and NGOs. The information gathered through the CEWS will then be used "… timeously to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also use this information for the execution of the

responsibilities and functions entrusted to him/her under the present Protocol [on the Peace and Security Council].”

The PSC Protocol determines that the Continental Early Warning System is to collect and analyze country data on the basis of an appropriate 'early warning indicators module'. This module must be based on political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators.

African Standby Force,

The African standby Force (ASF) is a preventive mechanism aimed at preventive deployment, humanitarian assistance and intervention in accordance with article 4 (h) and 4 (j) of the AU Constitutive Act, as a means to avert overt conflict. The ASF shall composed of standby multidisciplinary contingent with civilian and military components in the country of origin ready for development at appropriate notice on missions decided by the PSC or interventions authorised by the assembly.[24]

Military Staff Committee: The Military Staff Committee composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff or their representatives (of the countries serving on the PSC) is established in terms of Article 13 of the PSC Protocol to advise and assist the Council in all questions relating to military and security requirements. Any Member State not represented on the MSC may be invited by the Committee to participate in its deliberations when it is so required for the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities. The Third Meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff on the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee that met in Addis Ababa in May 2003 adopted a number of recommendations regarding the MSC. Amongst others these recommendations were that membership of the MSC should accord with those of the PSC and that the country holding the Chair of the PSC should also provide the Chair of the MSC.

Peace Fund: the AU intends creating a peace fund as a measure of resource mobilisation to support its attempts at conflict prevention, mangemanet and resolution.[25] The Peace Fund shall be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of Union, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources within Africa, including the private

sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities.[26]

In terms of Mechanisms and Protocols, alongside the Continental Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, there are several structures at the regional level, all of which were established by the existing Regional Economic Communities. These include the ECOWAS' protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security signed on 10. December 1999; IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) signed on 9th January 2002; the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security for Southern Africa; ECCAS' Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) and the mechanism which is being developed for CEN -SAD Community.

There are also a number of Civil Society Organizations, many of which are here today that perform the role of initiating and back-stopping the promotion of peace and security in the Continent in what has now come to be referred to as Truck 2 initiatives. These range from Humanitarian Organizations, Peace and Development Foundations, Religious institutions, Institutes and Universities, Professional Groups, Women ' s Movements, and Community Based Organizations (See article 20 of the AU Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council).

The African Peace and Security Architecture is informed by the African Peace and Security Agenda. Pursuant to the AU-NEPAD Peace and Security consultations in February 2003, eight priority areas were identified as constituting the African Peace and Security Agenda (APSA). These include: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD); Exploitation and Management of Natural Resources (EMNR); Children Affected by Conflict; Security Sector Transformation; terrorism Gender Mainstreaming of Peace and Security Processes; Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, capacity building and resource mobilisation.[27] At the core of this agenda is the need to engage in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict in a proactive manner grounded in African ownership.

Why Should Turkey be Interested in African Peace and Security Architecture and Agenda?

- Turkey has tried to diversify its energy sources away from Russia, which provides two-thirds of the country's natural gas, but achieving this goal has been difficult. As one of the fastest growing economies, Africa and Turkey are both emerging markets. Africa can provide Turkey with natural resources to sustain its economic boom, while benefiting from the latter's technological savvy.

- Such a win win partnership could only be sustained if there is peace. As such Turkish could enhance its support for African peace initiative. This can also go a long way to bolster the visibility of Turkey on the continent thus providing the political and diplomatic clout for its engagement.

How should Turkey Engage Africa?

- Partnership not paternalistic relationship
- Not just a market for raw materials but sustained interaction based on mutual benefit
- Respect for internal affairs of African states

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[11] Phillippe Le Billon (2001) op cit.

[12] Pierre Englebert and James Ron (2004) op cit

[13] Micheal L. Ross, Michael (2003a). 'Oil, Drugs and Diamonds: The Varying Role of Natural Resources in Civil War', in Karen Ballentine & Jake Sherman, eds, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict Beyond Greed and Grievance*. Lynner Rienner publishers: Boulder 2003 pp. 47-70

[14] Michael Bratton, Nicholas van de Walle Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics):

[15] Kaplan op cit

[16] Cited in Adedeji op cit

[17] Cited in Furley, O. 1995. *Conflict in Africa*. Tauris Academic Studies.1995

[18] Cited in Adedeji pp 9

[19] Cited in Ajulu, R. (2003) "African Security: Can Regional Organisations Play a Role?" In Field, S (ed) *Peace in Africa: Towards a Collaborative Security Regime*. Institute of Global Dialogue. Johannesburg 2004

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[22] Makinda, Samuel, M *The African Union: Challenges of Globalisation, Security and Governance* Routledge Global Institutions, UK 2007

[23] This sections borrows heavily from the Institute for Security Studies Profile of the AU www.issafrica.org

[24] Article 13 (1) of the AU Protocol Relating to the establishment of the PSC

[25] Article 21 (1) of the AU Protocol Relating to the establishment of the PSC

[26] Article 21 (2) of the AU Protocol Relating to the establishment of the PSC

[27] Report of the AUNEPAD Consultations on Peace and Security, 1718 February 2003,